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To Harvest and Jam: A Paradigm of Self-Sustaining
Friendly Jammers for Secure AF Relaying
Hong Xing, Kai-Kit Wong, Zheng Chu, and Arumugam Nallanathan
Abstract—This paper studies the use of multi-antenna harvest-
and-jam (HJ) helpers in a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward
(AF) relay wiretap channel assuming that the direct link between
the source and destination is broken. Our objective is to maximize
the secrecy rate at the destination subject to the transmit power
constraints of the AF relay and the HJ helpers. In the case of
perfect channel state information (CSI), the joint optimization
of the artificial noise (AN) covariance matrix for cooperative
jamming and the AF beamforming matrix is studied using semi-
definite relaxation (SDR) which is tight, while suboptimal solu-
tions are also devised with lower complexity. For the imperfect
CSI case, we provide the equivalent reformulation of the worst-
case robust optimization to maximize the minimum achievable
secrecy rate. Inspired by the optimal solution to the case of
perfect CSI, a suboptimal robust scheme is proposed striking
a good tradeoff between complexity and performance. Finally,
numerical results for various settings are provided to evaluate
the proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Harvest-and-jam, artificial noise, cooperative
jamming, amplify-and-forward relay, wireless energy transfer,
physical-layer security, semi-definite relaxation, robust optimiza-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pressing demand for high data rate in wireless commu-
nications networks coupled with the fact that mobile devices
are physically small and power-limited by batteries, has driven
the notion of energy harvesting (EH) to become a promising
resolution for green communications [1, 2]. Among the var-
ied available resources for EH, radio-frequency (RF)-enabled
wireless energy transfer (WET) has aroused an upsurge of
interest for its long operation range, ubiquitous existence in
the electromagnetic radiation, and effective energy multicas-
ting, which motivates the paradigm of simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT), e.g., [3–6].
A typical SWIPT system consists of one access point (AP)
that has constant power supply and broadcasts wireless signals
to a group of user terminals, amongst which some intend
to decode information, referred to as information receivers
(IRs), while others scavenge energy from the ambient radio
signals, named energy receivers (ERs). This gives rise to a
challenging physical (PHY)-layer security issue where the
ERs may eavesdrop the information sent to the IRs due to
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their close proximity to the AP To overcome this problem,
in [7–9], several researchers presented various approaches to
guarantee secret communication to the IRs and maximize the
energy simultaneously transferred to the ERs or to satisfy
the individual EH requirement for the ERs and maximize the
secrecy rate for the IR, by advocating the dual use of the
artificial noise (AN) or jamming.
However, previous works all assumed that the ERs in the
SWIPT systems attempt to intercept the information for the
IR, which is overly protective. On the contrary, it is possible
that some ERs are cooperative, especially when they are EH-
enabled wirelessly. Following the recent advances in wireless
powered communications networks [10, 11], this paper pro-
poses a self-sustaining harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol,
where in the first transmission phase a single-antenna trans-
mitter transfers confidential information to a multiple-antenna
amplify-and-forward (AF) relay and power to a group of multi-
antenna EH-enabled idle helpers simultaneously, while in the
second phase, the relay amplifies and forwards the information
to the IR under the protection of the AN generated by the
helpers using the energy harvested from their received signals
in the first transmission phase.
Physical (PHY)-layer security issues in the rapidly growing
cooperative networks have attracted much attention. Cooper-
ative approaches, such as, cooperative jamming, communi-
cations have been widely examined [12–15]. The idea is to
assist the transmitter in the secrecy transmission by generating
an AN to interfere with the eavesdropper via either multiple
antennas or external trusted helpers [16–19]. However, all of
those utilizing ANs require additional supply of power and
therefore incur extra system costs. Meanwhile, collaborative
use of relays to form effective beams jamming the eavesdrop-
per, i.e., secure collaborative relay beamforming, has been
studied for relay-wiretap channels with single eavesdropper
in [20], multiple eavesdroppers with AF relays and decode-
and-forward (DF) relays in [21] and [22], respectively. All,
however, assumed the availability of perfect channel state
information (CSI). Though [23] proposed robust AF relay
beamforming against the eavesdropper’s channel, the solutions
were yet suboptimal.
The assumption of perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers appears
to be too ideal because the eavesdroppers, despite being
legitimate users, wish to hide from the transmitter without
being cooperative in the stage of channel estimation. Even if
they are registered users and bound to help the transmitter
in obtaining their CSIs to facilitate their own communication,
the CSIs at the transmitter side will change due to mobility
and Doppler effect, and may be outdated. Moreover, even
2for the legitimate users, the estimated CSIs may also be
subject to quantization errors due to the limited capacity of
the feedback channel, although the inaccuracy is reasonably
assumed less severe than that for the eavesdroppers. To tackle
this issue, state-of-art schemes have been developed ([24]
and the references therein), among which the worst-case
secrecy rate is commonly employed to formulate the robust
secrecy rate maximization problem [8, 19, 25–27]. The robust
transmit covariance design for the secrecy rate maximization
in a multiple-input-single-output (MISO) channel overheard
by multi-antenna eavesdroppers was considered in [25, 28]
while the enhanced secrecy performance was achieved by
introducing a friendly jammer in the same scenario in [26], in
which a joint optimization of the robust transmit covariance
and power allocation between the source and the helper was
studied via geometric programming. More recently, [8] studied
a joint robust design of the information beams, the AN and
the energy signals for SWIPT networks with quality-of-service
(QoS) constraints.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, with perfect
CSI, in addition to the joint optimal solutions, we propose
two near-optimal schemes with much reduced complexity by
exploiting the optimal structure of the relay weight matrix,
and providing a semi-closed form solution for the relay weight
matrix given fixed null-space jamming, respectively. Second,
besides the imperfect eavesdropper’s channel, legitimate chan-
nels such as those from the K HJ helpers (the transmitter) to
the legitimate receiver (K HJ helpers), and from the AF relay
to the receiver are jointly modeled with imperfect estimation,
and multiple semi-indefinite non-convex constraints have been
judiciously replaced by linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) to
fit the semi-definite programming (SDP). Third, a rank-one
reconstruction algorithm exploiting the structure of the semi-
definite relaxation (SDR)-based solutions has been proposed
to provide promising performance at low computational cost.
Of particular relevance to our work is [29] which jointly
optimizes the AF matrices and AN covariances in a relay
wiretap channel with multiple multi-antenna AF relays and
multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers via a worst-case robust
formulation. While our network model is similar, the differ-
ence of our work from [29] is twofold. On one hand, in this
paper, the AN generated by the friendly jammers are subject to
their respective channels from the transmitter during WET in
the first transmission phase. On the other hand, the technique
in [29, Proposition 1] cannot be applied to our problem since
the AN beams and the forwarded information are transmitted
via different channels in ours. As a consequence, to the best
of authors’ knowledge, our proposed worst-case based robust
optimization scheme that incorporates imperfect CSIs into all
the HJ helpers, has not been addressed in the literature.
It is worth noting that devising a wireless-powered friendly
jammer to enhance PHY-layer security for a direct transmis-
sion protocol was studied in [30], in which the “harvesting”
blocks and “jamming” blocks were well exploited to compose
four different types of harvesting-jamming cycles. Compared
to [30], which focused on the dedicated scheduling of “har-
vest” and “jam” operations and its long-term performance,
ours are concerned with adaptive rate/power optimization with
multiple HJ helpers to achieve higher worst-case secrecy rate.
Moreover, instead of assuming perfect channels to/from the
HJ helpers, our robust optimization algorithm takes imperfect
legitimate channels into account to provide robustness.
Note that in this paper, as in [23, 29], we assume that the
channel between the transmitter and the AF relay is perfectly
known and there is no direct link between the transmitter and
the receiver or the eavesdropper, a common assumption in the
concerned AF relay wiretap channel [20, 21].
Notations—Throughout, we use the upper case boldface
letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors.
The superscripts (·)T , (·)† and (·)H represent the transpose,
conjugate and conjugate transpose, respectively. Also, tr(·)
and E[·] stand for the trace of a matrix and the statistical ex-
pectation for random variables, respectively. Likewise, vec(A)
is defined as a column vector obtained by stacking the rows
of A on top of one another. vec(−1) is the inverse operation
of vec. null(A) denotes the null space of A. ⊗ represents the
Kronecker product of two matrices. In addition, the notation
A  0 indicates thatA is a positive semi-definite matrix and I
(0) denotes an identity (all-zero) matrix with appropriate size.
Furthermore, ‖ · ‖ represents the Euclidean norm of a vector,
while Pr(·) stands for the probability of an input random
event. Finally, [x]+ denotes max(0, x) and (·)∗ stands for an
optimal solution.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a cooperative relay wiretap channel for SWIPT
over a given frequency band as shown in Fig. 1(a). We assume
that there is a transmitter, named Alice, sending confidential
messages to the IR, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper
[31], Eve, with the aid of a multi-antenna AF relay and K
ERs willing to act as HJ helpers, Hhelper = {H1, . . . ,HK}.
The transmitter, ERs, and the AF relay are deployed in a same
cluster that is relatively far away from the destination and Eve,
such that there is no direct link from the transmitter to the
receiver or Eve, respectively. Moreover, the ERs are assumed
to be located closer to the transmitter than the AF relay in
order that they can harvest sufficient amount of energy for
jamming. Alice, Bob and Eve are all assumed to be equipped
with single antenna, while the AF relay and each of the K
helpers are assumed to have the same Nt antennas.
Using two equal slots for the HJ relaying protocol, as shown
in Fig. 1(b), for the first phase, Alice sends a confidential
message to the relay while simultaneously transferring energy
to the K helpers; for the second phase, the relay amplifies and
forwards the message to Bob while the K helpers perform
cooperative jamming using their respective harvested energy
from the first transmission phase, to compromise Eve. In this
paper, we assume a quasi-static fading environment and for
convenience denote h0 ∈ CNt×1 as the complex channel from
the transmitter to the relay and hk ∈ CNt×1, k = 1, . . . ,K ,
as that from the transmitter to the kth helper; h˜0 as the
transpose of the complex channel from the relay to Bob
and h˜k ∈ CNt×1, k = 1, . . . ,K , as that from Hk to Bob;
g0 ∈ CNt×1 and gk ∈ CNt×1, k = 1, . . . ,K , as those from
the relay and Hk to Eve, respectively.
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Fig. 1. HJ-enabled cooperative relaying for secure SWIPT.
In the first transmission phase, the baseband received signal
at the AF relay can be expressed as
yr = h0
√
Pss+ nr, (1)
where s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
random variable, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1) and nr is the
additive complex noise vector, denoted by nr ∼ CN (0, σ2rI).
Also, Ps denotes the given transmit power at Alice. Further,
the received signal at each helper Hk is expressed as
yk = hk
√
Pss+ n
′
k, (2)
where n′k is the additive noise, denoted by n′k ∼ CN (0, σ2hI).
On the other hand, for WET, the harvested energy of Hk in
each unit slot is given by
Ek = ηE[‖hk
√
Pss‖2] = ηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (3)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 denotes the EH efficiency.
In the second transmission phase, the linear operation at the
AF relay can be represented by
x′ =Wyr, (4)
where x′ ∈ CNt×1 is the retransmit signal at the AF relay
and W ∈ CNt×Nt is the beamforming matrix. Note that the
transmit power of the AF relay can be shown as
tr
(
E
[
xxH
])
= tr
(
W
(
Psh0h
H
0 + σ
2
rI
)
WH
)
, (5)
which is constrained by the maximum available power at the
AF relay, i.e., Pr, which is given by
tr
(
W
(
Psh0h
H
0 + σ
2
rI
)
WH
)
≤ Pr. (6)
In the meantime, each Hk will help generate an AN nk ∈
CNt×1 to interfere with Eve. Similar to [16], we assume
that nk’s are independent CSCG vectors denoted by nk ∼
CN (0,Qk), ∀k, since the worst-case noise for Eve is known
to be Gaussian. In addition, each Hk has a transmit power con-
straint due to its harvested energy in the previous transmission
phase, i.e., tr(Qk) ≤ ηPs‖hk‖2 (c.f. (3)), ∀k.
The received signal at Bob can thus be expressed as
yb =
√
Psh˜
T
0Wh0s+
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
knk + h˜
T
0Wnr + nb, (7)
where nb ∼ CN (0, σ2bI) is the additive noise at Bob. Simi-
larly, the received signal at Eve can be expressed as
ye =
√
Psg
T
0Wh0s+
K∑
k=1
gTknk + g
T
0Wnr + ne, (8)
where ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eI). According to (7) and (8), the signal-
to-interference-plus-nose-ratio (SINR) at Bob and Eve can be,
respectively, expressed as
γb =
Ps|h˜
T
0Wh0|2
σ2r h˜
T
0WW
H h˜
†
0 +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
, (9)
and
γe =
Ps|gT0Wh0|2
σ2rg
T
0WW
Hg
†
0 +
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k + σ
2
e
. (10)
As such, the achievable secrecy rate at Bob is [16]
r0 =
1
2
[log2(1 + γb)− log2(1 + γe)]+ . (11)
III. JOINT AN-AF BEAMFORMING WITH PERFECT CSI
A. Problem Formulation for Perfect CSI
We aim to maximize the secrecy rate at Bob subject to the
transmit power constraints at the AF relay and each individual
helper Hk, k = 1, . . . ,K . Thus, our problem is to solve
(P1) : max
{Qk},W
r0
s.t. (6), (12a)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (12b)
Qk  0, ∀k. (12c)
Next, we define a new function F¯ ({Qk},W ) as
F¯ ({Qk},W ) ,
1 + γb
1 + γe
. (13)
It can be easily shown that the optimal solution {Q∗k}, W ∗
to (P1), is also optimal for (P1′) given by
(P1′) : max
{Qk},W
F¯ ({Qk},W ) s.t. (12a)− (12c). (14)
Hence, we focus on solving problem (P1′) in the rest of
the paper. However, since (P1′) is in general a non-convex
problem that is hard to solve, we will reformulate it into a
two-stage optimization problem. First, we constrain the SINR
at Eve to be γ¯e, it thus follows from (13) that F¯ ({Qk},W )
4is maximized when γb is maximized, which can be obtained
by solving the following problem:
(P1′.1) : max
{Qk,W}
Ps|h˜
T
0Wh0|2
σ2r h˜
T
0WW
H h˜
†
0 +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
s.t.
Ps|gT0Wh0|2
σ2rg
T
0WW
Hg
†
0 +
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k + σ
2
e
= γ¯e,
(12a)− (12c). (15)
Let H(γ¯e) denote the optimal value of (P1′.1) given γ¯e. Then
(P1′) can be equivalently solved by
(P1′.2) : max
γ¯e>0
1 +H(γ¯e)
1 + γ¯e
. (16)
Lemma 3.1: Problem (P1′) has the same optimal value as
(P1′.2), and the same optimal solution as (P1′.1) when γ¯e
takes the optimal solution for (P1′.2).
Proof: The proof follows from [7, Lemmas 4.1-4.2].
Therefore, (P1′) can be solved in the following two steps.
First, given any γ¯e > 0, we solve (P1′.1) to attain H(γ¯e);
then we solve (P1′.2) to obtain the optimal γ¯∗e .
B. Optimal Solution to (P1′.1)
Here, we consider solving problem (P1′.1) by jointly op-
timizing the covariance matrix for the AN at each of the HJ
helper, Qk’s, and the beamforming matrix, W . To facilitate
the analysis in the sequel, we rewrite the following equations
in line with our definition of vec(·) [32, Chapter 13]:
|h˜T0Wh0|2 = |vecT (h˜0hT0 )vec(W )|2, (17)
h˜
T
0WW
H h˜
†
0 = ‖h˜
T
0 ⊗ Ivec(W )‖2, (18)
|gT0Wh0|2 = |vecT (g0hT0 )vec(W )|2, (19)
gT0WW
Hg
†
0 = ‖gT0 ⊗ Ivec(W )‖2. (20)
In addition, tr(W (Psh0hH0 + σ2rI)WH) = ‖Φw‖2, where
Φ = (I ⊗ΘT )1/2 with Θ = Psh0hH0 + σ2rI . Hence, (P1′.1)
can be rewritten as
(P1′.1-RW) :
max
W ,{Qk}
Ps|fT1w|2
σ2r ‖Y 1w‖2 +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
s.t.
Ps|fT2w|2
σ2r ‖Y 2w‖2 +
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k + σ
2
e
= γ¯e,
(21a)
‖Φw‖2 ≤ Pr, (21b)
(12b), (12c),
in which w = vec(W ), f1 = vec(h˜0h
T
0 ), f2 = vec(g0h
T
0 ),
Y 1 = h˜
T
0 ⊗ I and Y 2 = gT0 ⊗ I .
As problem (P1′.1-RW) is non-convex, we define X ,
wwH , F 1 , f
†
1f
T
1 , F 2 , f
†
2f
T
2 , Y 1 , Y
H
1 Y 1, Y 2 ,
Y H2 Y 2 and Φ , ΦHΦ. Then by ignoring the rank-one
constraint on X , (P1′.1-RW) is modified as
(P1′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) :
max
X,{Qk}
Pstr(F 1X)
σ2r tr(Y 1X) +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
s.t. Pstr(F 2X)
= γ¯e
(
σ2r tr(Y 2X) +
K∑
k=1
gTkQkg
†
k + σ
2
e
)
, (22a)
tr(ΦX) ≤ Pr , (22b)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (22c)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k. (22d)
Problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv), via Charnes-Cooper trans-
formation [33], can be equivalently recast as
(P1′.1-RW-SDR) : max
X,{Qk},τ
Pstr(F 1X)
s.t. σ2rtr(Y 1X) +
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + τσ
2
b = 1, (23a)
Pstr(F 2X)
= γ¯e
(
σ2r tr(Y 2X) +
K∑
k=1
gTkQkg
†
k + τσ
2
e
)
, (23b)
tr(ΦX) ≤ τPr , (23c)
tr (Qk) ≤ τηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (23d)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k, τ ≥ 0. (23e)
Lemma 3.2: The constraints in (23a) and (23b) can be
replaced by σ2r tr(Y 1X) +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + τσ
2
b ≤ 1 and
Pstr(F 2X) ≤ γ¯e(σ2r tr(Y 2X) +
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k + τσ
2
e),
respectively, where both inequalities will be activated when
problem (P1′) obtains its optimum value.
Proof: See [34, Appendix A].
Since problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR) is a standard convex op-
timization problem and satisfies the Slater’s condition, its gap
with its dual problem is zero [35]. Now, let λ denote the
dual variable associated with the equality constraint in (23a),
α associated with the other equality constraint in (23b), β0
associated with the transmit power constraint for the AF relay
in (23c), {βk} associated with the transmit power constraints
for each Hk in (23d), and ζ associated with τ . Then the
Lagrangian of problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR) is given by
L(Ω) = tr(AX) +
K∑
k=1
tr(BkQk) + ζτ + λ, (24)
where Ω denotes the set of all primal and dual variables,
A = PsF 1 − λσ2rY 1 − αPsF 2 + αγ¯eσ2rY 2 − β0Φ, (25)
Bk = −λh˜∗kh˜
T
k + αγ¯eg
∗
kg
T
k − βkI, ∀k, (26)
ζ = −λσ2b + αγ¯eσ2e + β0Pr +
K∑
k=1
ηPsβk‖hk‖2. (27)
Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution, (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ∗), to
(P1′.1-RW-SDR) satisfies the following conditions:
51) rank(Qk)
{ ≥ Nt − 2, if β∗k = 0,
= 1, if β∗k > 0,
∀k;
2) X∗ can be expressed as
X∗ =
N2t−rc∑
n=1
anηnη
H
n + bξξ
H , (28)
where an ≥ 0 ∀n, b > 0, rc = rank(C∗) (c.f. (88)) and
ξ ∈ CN2t×1 is a vector orthogonal to Ξ = {ηn}N
2
t−rc
n=1 ,
which consists of orthonormal basis for null(C∗);
3) According to (28), if rank(X∗) > 1, then we have the
following sufficient condition to yield an optimal solution
of X with rank-one:
Xˆ
∗
= bξξH , (29)
Qˆ
∗
k = Q
∗
k, ∀k, (30)
τˆ∗ = τ∗ +∆τ, (31)
is also optimal to problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR), if there
exists ∆τ ≥ 0 such thatN2t−rc∑
n=1
antr
(
ηHn (
σ2rY 2
σ2e
− PsF 2γeσ2e )ηn
)+
≤ ∆τ ≤ σ2r
σ2
b
N2t−rc∑
n=1
antr
(
ηHn Y 1ηn
)
. (32)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note from Proposition 3.1 that if rank(X∗) = 1, then
the optimal w∗ to (P1′.1-RW) can be found directly from
the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of X∗, where X∗ =
X∗/τ∗. Namely, the upper-bound optimum value obtained
by solving (P1′.1-RW-SDR) is tight in this case; otherwise,
(X∗, {Q∗k}, τ∗) only serves as an upper-bound solution.
Now, we show that this upper-bound is always achievable
by a rank-one X∗. When rank(X∗) > 1, firstly, we check
whether the sufficient condition proposed in (32) is satisfied. If
it is met, then a direct reconstruction of (Xˆ
∗
, {Qˆ∗k}, τˆ∗) with
rank(Xˆ
∗
) = 1 follows according to (29)–(31); otherwise, as-
sume that any optimal solution to problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR)
has no zero component, i.e., (X∗ 6= 0, {Q∗k 6= 0}, τ∗ 6= 0). In
addition, the number of optimization variables and the number
of shaping constraints are denoted by L and M , respectively.
Since L = K +2 and M = K +3 for (P1′.1-RW-SDR), we
have M ≤ L+2 satisfied. Thus, according to [36, Proposition
3.5], (P1′.1-RW-SDR) has an optimal solution of Xˆ∗ that is
rank-one. Also, the detailed rank reduction procedure based on
an arbitrary-rank solution has been given in [36, Algorithm 1].
Algorithm I for solving (P1′) is shown in Table I.
C. Suboptimal Solutions to (P1′.1)
1) Optimal Solution Structure based Scheme: We propose
a relay beamforming design for (P1′.1) based on the optimal
structure of W [37, Theorem 3.1]. First, define H1 , [h˜0 g0]
and H2 , [h0 g0]. Then express the truncated singular-value
decomposition (SVD) of H1 and H2, respectively, as
H1 = U1Σ1V
H
1 , (33)
H2 = U2Σ2V
H
2 . (34)
TABLE I
Algorithm I for (P1′)
• Initialize γ¯e search = 0 : α : γ¯emax and i = 0
• Repeat
1) Set i = i+ 1;
2) Given γ¯e = γ¯e search(i),
solve (P1′.1-RW-SDR) and obtain H(γ¯(i)e ).
• Until i = L, where L = ⌊ γ¯emax
α
⌋+ 1 is the length of γ¯e search
• Set γ¯∗e = γ¯e search
(
argmax
i
{
1+H(γ¯
(i)
e )
1+γ¯
(i)
e
})
for (P1′.2)
• Given γ¯∗e , solve (P1′.1-RW-SDR) to obtain (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ∗)
if rank(X∗) = 1, apply EVD on X∗ such that X∗ = w∗w∗H ;
else if the sufficient condition in (32) is satisfied,
construct (Xˆ∗, {Qˆ∗k}, τˆ∗) following (29)-(31) and set w∗ =
√
bξ;
else construct Xˆ∗ using the procedure in [36, Algorithm 1].
end
end
• Recover W ∗ = vec−1(w∗)
Lemma 3.3: The optimal relay beamforming matrix W for
problem (P1′.1) is of the form:
W = U †1BU
H
2 +U
†
1C(U
⊥
2 )
H , (35)
where B ∈ C2×2 and C ∈ C2×(Nt−2) are two unknown
matrices, and U⊥1 , U⊥2 ∈ CNt×(Nt−2) satisfy U⊥1 (U⊥1 )H =
I −U1UH1 , U⊥2 (U⊥2 )H = I −U2UH2 , respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Denote UH1 h˜0, U
H
2 h0, U
H
1 g0 by
¯˜
h0, h¯0, g¯0, respectively.
We thus simplify |h˜T0Wh0|2 and |gT0Wh0|2 as |¯˜hT0Bh¯0|2
and |g¯T0Bh¯0|2, respectively. Since C has 2(Nt − 2) complex
variables, we devise a suboptimal design for C to reduce the
size of variables by (Nt − 2). Specifically, let C = u′⊥vT ,
where u′ = ¯˜h†0/‖¯˜h0‖ such that u′⊥u′⊥H = I − u′u′H .
Hence, h˜
T
0WW
H h˜
†
0, g
T
0WW
Hg
†
0 and (5) can be reduced
to ‖BH ¯˜h†0‖2, ‖BH g¯†0‖2 + |v†u′⊥H g¯†0|2 and Ps‖Bh¯0‖2 +
σ2rtr(B
HB)+σ2r‖v‖2, respectively. Then define b = vec(B),
f¯1 = vec(
¯˜
h0h¯
T
0 ), f¯2 = vec(g¯0h¯
T
0 ), Y
′
1 =
¯˜
hT0 ⊗ I, Y ′2 =
g¯T0 ⊗ I , and Φ′ = (I ⊗Θ′T )1/2 with Θ′ = Psh¯0h¯H0 + σ2rI;
Z = bbH , V = vvH , F 1 = f¯
†
1f¯
T
1 , F 2 = f¯
†
2f¯
T
2 ,
Y
′
1 = Y
′H
1 Y
′
1, Y
′
2 = Y
′H
2 Y
′
2, and Φ
′
= Φ′HΦ′. The
suboptimal design for problem (P1′.1) by ignoring the rank
constraints on Z and V is thus given by
(P1′.1-sub1-SDR) : max
Z,V ,{Qk},τ
Pstr(F 1Z)
s.t. σ2r tr(Y
′
1Z) +
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + τσ
2
b = 1, (36a)
Pstr(F 2Z) ≤ γ¯e(
σ2r
(
tr(Y
′
2Z) + |g¯T0 u′⊥|2tr(V )
)
+
K∑
k=1
gTkQkg
†
k + τσ
2
e
)
,
(36b)
tr(Φ
′
Z) + σ2rtr(Z) + σ
2
r tr(V ) ≤ τPr , (36c)
tr (Qk) ≤ τηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (36d)
τ ≥ 0, Qk  0, ∀k, Z  0, V  0. (36e)
Remark 3.1: The variables in (P1′.1-sub1-SDR), i.e., Z ∈
6C4×4, V ∈ C(Nt−2)×(Nt−2), are of much reduced size. Fur-
ther, the reconstruction of v∗ from V can be briefly explained
as follows. Given the Lagrangian of (P1′.1-sub1-SDR), the
KKT conditions with respect to (w.r.t.) V ∗ are given by
(α∗γ¯e|g¯T0 u′⊥|2 − β∗0σ2r)I +U∗ = 0, (37)
U∗V ∗ = 0. (38)
Post-multiplying (37) with V ∗, we have (α∗γ¯e|g¯T0 u′⊥|2 −
β∗0σ
2
r)V
∗ = 0. As a result, if α
∗
β∗0
6= σ2r
γ¯e|g¯T0 u′⊥|2
, V ∗ = 0;
otherwise V ∗ = v∗v∗H , with v∗ =
√
tr(V ∗)v0, where
v0 ∈ C(Nt−2)×1 is an arbitrary vector with unit norm. With V
solved, (P1′.1-sub1-SDR) reduces to a problem with similar
structure as (P1′.1-RW-SDR), and the proof for existence of
a rank-one Z can be referred to Proposition 3.1.
2) Zero-forcing: We propose a low-complexity ZF scheme
for (P1′.1), in which the jamming signal places a null at
Bob, and then a semi-closed form solution for W is derived.
In line with the principle of ZF jamming [17], the jamming
signal nk is designed as nk = V˜ kn˜k such that I −
˜h
†
k
˜h
T
k
‖
˜hk‖2
=
V˜ kV˜
H
k , and n˜k ∈ C(Nt−1)×1 is an arbitrary random vector,
n˜k ∼ CN (0, Q˜k), k = 1, . . . ,K . Thus, given any W , n˜k’s
can be optimized to maximize the effect of jamming at Eve
by max
Q˜k
∑K
k=1 g
T
k V˜ kQ˜kV˜
H
k g
†
k, which gives Q˜
∗
k = ζ
2
k g˜
†
kg˜
T
k ,
where g˜k = V˜
T
k gk, and ζk =
√
ηPs‖hk‖/‖g˜k‖ is determined
by (23d), ∀k. As such, ∑Kk=1 gTk V˜ kQ˜∗kV˜ Hk g†k turns out to be∑K
k=1 ηPs‖hk‖2‖g˜k‖2, which is denoted by q.
With fixed q, (P1′.1-RW-SDR) can be recast as
(P1′.1-sub2-SDR) : max
X,τ
Pstr(F 1X)
s.t. σ2rtr(Y 1X) + τσ
2
b = 1, (39a)
Pstr(F 2X) ≤ γ¯e
(
σ2r tr(Y 2X) + τq + τσ
2
e
)
, (39b)
tr(ΦX) ≤ τPr , (39c)
X  0, τ ≥ 0. (39d)
Proposition 3.2: (P1′.1-sub2-SDR) must yield a rank-one
solution, i.e., X∗ = ww∗, such that w∗ = µνmax(Z∗), and
Z∗ =PsF 1 − λ∗σ2rY 1 − α∗PsF 2
+ α∗γ¯eσ
2
rY 2 − β∗0Φ, (40)
where νmax(·) represents the eigenvector corresponding to
the largest eigenvalue of the associated matrix, and µ =√
Pr
tr(Φ)νmax(Z
∗
)νHmax(Z
∗
)
. Also, λ∗, α∗ and β∗0 are the opti-
mal dual variables associated with (39a)–(39c), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The only problem in Proposition 3.2 is the dual problem of
(P1′.1-sub2-SDR), which admits a much simpler structure to
solve than the primal one.
IV. JOINT AN-AF BEAMFORMING WITH IMPERFECT CSI
A. Problem Formulation for Imperfect CSI
We use a deterministic spherical model [25, 26] to charac-
terize the resulting CSIs’ uncertainties such that
G0 ={g0|g0 = gˆ0 +∆g0,∆gH0 W 0∆g0 ≤ 1}, (41a)
Gk ={gk|gk = gˆk +∆gk,∆gHk W k∆gk ≤ 1}, ∀k, (41b)
H˜0 ={h˜0|h˜0 = ˆ˜h0 +∆h˜0,∆h˜H0 W ′0∆h˜0 ≤ 1}, (41c)
H˜k ={h˜k|h˜k = ˆ˜hk +∆h˜k,∆h˜Hk W ′′k∆h˜k ≤ 1}, ∀k, (41d)
Hk ={hk|hk = hˆk +∆hk,∆hHk W ′k∆hk ≤ 1}, ∀k, (41e)
where gˆ0, gˆk’s,
ˆ˜
h0,
ˆ˜
hk’s and hˆk’s are the estimates of
the corresponding channels; ∆g0, ∆gk’s, ∆h˜0, ∆h˜k’s and
∆hk’s are their respective channel errors; the matrices W 0,
W k’s, W
′
0, W
′′
k’s and W ′k’s determine the shape of each
error region. Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), we set
W 0 = I/ǫ0, W
′
0 = I/ǫ
′
0, W k = I/ǫk, W
′
k = I/ǫ
′
k
and W ′′k = I/ǫ′′k for simplicity, where ǫ0, ǫ′0, ǫk, ǫ′k, and
ǫ′′k represent the respective size of the bounded error regions,
k = 1, . . . ,K .
Accordingly, we denote the robust counterpart for (P1′) as
(P2′) : max
{Qk},W
min
h˜0∈H˜0,h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
g0∈G0,g˜k∈G˜k,∀k
F¯ ({Qk},W )
s.t. tr
(
W
(
Psh0h
H
0 + σ
2
rI
)
WH
)
≤ Pr, (42a)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs min
hk∈Hk,∀k
‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (42b)
Qk  0, ∀k. (42c)
An equivalent robust reformulation of (P1′.2) is given by
(P2′.2) : max
γ¯e>0
1 + Hˆ(γ¯e)
1 + Fˆ (γ¯e)
, (43)
where Fˆ (γ¯e) = γe and Hˆ(γ¯e) denotes the optimal value of
problem (P2′.1) that is given by
(P2′.1) :
max
X,{Qk}
min
h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X)
σ2r tr(Y 1X) +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
s.t. max
gk∈Gk,∀k
g0∈G0
Pstr(F 2X)
σ2r tr(Y 2X) +
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k + σ
2
e
≤ γ¯e,
(44a)
tr(ΦX) ≤ Pr, (44b)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs min
hk∈Hk,∀k
‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (44c)
rank(X) = 1, (44d)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k. (44e)
As stated in Lemma 3.1, similarly, (P2′) can be proved to
have the same optimal value as (P2′.2) and the same optimal
solution as (P2′.1) when γ¯e takes its optimal value. As a
result, (P2′) can be solved in a two-stage fashion as well.
Specifically, given any γ¯e, we first solve (P2′.1) to obtain
Hˆ(γ¯e) and then search for the optimal γ¯e to (P2′.2).
7B. Solutions to (P2′.1)
By ignoring (44d), (P2′.1) is recast as
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) :
max
X,{Qk}
min
h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X)
σ2r tr(Y 1X) +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
s.t.(44a)− (44c), (44e). (45a)
It is worth noting that due to the rank-one re-
laxation of (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv), solution provided by
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) in general yields an upper-bound for
Hˆ(γ¯e), which may not be achievable. However, in the sequel
we insist on solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) that is regarded as
an upper-bound benchmark for our proposed problem detailed
later in this subsection.
1) Solutions to (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv): To make the “max-
min” objective function of (45) tractable, we first rewrite (45)
by the equivalent epigraph formulation as
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) :
max
X,{Qk},δ
δ
s.t. min
h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X)
σ2r tr(Y 1X) +
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k + σ
2
b
≥ δ,
(46a)
(44a)− (44c), (44e). (46b)
As there are potentially infinite number of constraints in (46a),
(44a), and (44c), they are semi-indefinite and thus intractable.
In the following, we equivalently transform these constraints
to tractable ones using S-Procedure and a generalized S-
Procedure given in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Lemma 4.1: (S-Procedure [35]) Let fm(x), m = 1, 2 be
defined as
fm(x) = x
HAmx+ 2ℜ{bHmx}+ cm, (47)
where Am = AHm ∈ CN×N , bm ∈ CN×1 and cm ∈ R, and
ℜ gives the real part of the input entity. Then the implication
f1(x) ≥ 0 ⇒ f2(x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there exists
δ ≥ 0 such that[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
− δ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
 0, (48)
provided there exists a point xˆ such that fm(xˆ) > 0, m = 1, 2.
Lemma 4.2: ([38, Theorem 3.5]) The robust block quadratic
matrix inequality (QMI),[
H F +GX
(F +GX)H C +XHB +BHX +XHAX
]
 0,
for all I −XHDX  0,
(49)
is equivalent to
∃t ≥ 0, such that
H F GFH C BH
GH B A
− t
0 0 00 I 0
0 0 −D
  0.
(50)
First, by rearranging terms, (46a) can be equivalently trans-
formed into the following linear form:
min
h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X)− δσ2r tr(Y 1X)
− δ
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k − δσ2b ≥ 0. (51)
Recalling the following matrix equalities in line with our
definition of vec(·) operation:
tr(ABT ) = vecT (A)vec(B), (52)
vec(AXB) = (A⊗BT )vec(X), (53)
(A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT , (54)
it follows that
tr(F 1X) = h˜
T
(h0 ⊗ I)X(hH0 ⊗ I)h˜
†
, (55)
tr(Y 1X) = h˜
T
(I ⊗X)h˜†, (56)
where h˜ ∈ CN3t×1 = vec(h˜T0 ⊗ I). The equivalent channel
model for h˜ is given by h˜ = ˆ˜h+∆h˜, where ‖∆h˜‖2 ≤ Ntǫ′0
(c.f. (41)). By introducing X ′′ = (h0 ⊗ I)X(hH0 ⊗ I) and
X ′ = I ⊗X , (51) can thus be recast as
min
h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
h˜0∈H˜0
∆h˜
T
(PsX
′′−δσ2rX ′)∆h˜
†
+2ℜ{∆h˜T (PsX ′′−δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h†}
− δ
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k − δσ2b ≥ 0. (57)
Hence, according to Lemma 4.1, the implication ‖∆h˜‖2 ≤
Ntǫ
′
0 ⇒ (57) holds if and only if there exists w(0) ≥ 0 such
that the following LMI holds:[
H1 F 1
FH1 c1
]
 0, (58)
where H1 = PsX ′′ − δσ2rX ′ + w(0)I , F 1 =
(PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h† and c1 = ˆ˜hT (PsX ′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h† −
δ
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k − δσ2b − w(0)Ntǫ′0. Now, (46a) has been
equivalently reformulated as (58). To further cope with channel
uncertainties with regards to h˜k’s such that (58) holds for
h˜k ∈ H˜k, k = 1, . . . ,K , we need the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The semi-indefinite constraint of (57) can
be equivalently recast as the following block matrix inequality:H
(K)
1 F
(K)
1 G
(K)
1
F
(K)H
1 c
(K)
1 B
(K)H
1
G
(K)H
1 B
(K)
1 A
(K)
1
− w(K)
0 0 00 1 0
0 0 −Iǫ′′K
  0,
(59)
8where H(K)1 , F
(K)
1 and c
(K)
1 are recursively given by
H
(k)
1 =

[
A
(k−1)
1 +
w(k−1)
ǫ′′
k−1
I G
(k−1)H
1
G
(k−1)
1 H
(k−1)
1
]
, k > 1;
PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′ + w(0)I, k = 1,
(60)
F
(k)
1 =

[
B
(k−1)
1
F
(k−1)
1
]
, k > 1;
(PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h†, k = 1,
(61)
c
(k)
1 =
ˆ˜
hT (PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h† − δ
∑k
j=1
ˆ˜
hTj Qj
ˆ˜
h
†
j −
δ
∑K
i=k+1 h˜
T
i Qih˜
†
i − δσ2b − w(0)Ntǫ′0 −
∑k−1
l=1 w
(l)
, k =
1, . . . ,K . In addition, G(k)1 ∈ C(N
3
t+(k−1)Nt)×Nt = 0,
B
(k)
1 = −δQk ˆ˜h†k, A(k)1 = −δQk, k = 1, . . . ,K , and
{w(k) ≥ 0} denote pertinent auxiliary variables.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Next, (44a) is rewritten as
max
gk∈Gk,∀k
g0∈G0
gT
(
PsX
′′ − γ¯eσ2rX ′
)
g† − γ¯e
K∑
k=1
gTkQkg
†
k
− γ¯eσ2e ≤ 0, (62)
where g ∈ CN2t×1 = vec(gT0 ⊗I) and the equivalent imperfect
channel model is given by g = gˆ + ∆g such that ‖∆g‖2 ≤
Ntǫ0.
Proposition 4.2: The semi-indefinite constraint of (62) is
satisfied if and only if there exists v(k) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K ,
such that the following block matrix inequality holds:H
(K)
2 F
(K)
2 G
(K)
2
F
(K)H
2 c
(K)
2 B
(K)H
2
G
(K)H
2 B
(K)
2 A
(K)
2
− v(K)
0 0 00 1 0
0 0 −IǫK
  0,
(63)
where H(K)2 , F
(K)
2 and c
(K)
2 are recursively given by
H
(k)
2 =

[
A
(k−1)
2 +
v(k−1)
ǫk−1
I G
(k−1)H
2
G
(k−1)
2 H
(k−1)
2
]
, k > 1;
−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′ + v(0)I, k = 1,
(64)
F
(k)
2 =

[
B
(k−1)
2
F
(k−1)
2
]
, k > 1;
(−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′)gˆ†, k = 1,
(65)
c
(k)
2 = gˆ
T (−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′)gˆ† + γ¯e
k∑
j=1
gˆ
T
j Qj gˆ
†
j+
γ¯e
K∑
i=k+1
gTi Qig
†
i + γ¯eσ
2
e − v(0)Ntǫ0 −
k−1∑
l=1
v(l), (66)
k = 1, . . . ,K . Also, G(k)2 = G
(k)
1 , B
(k)
2 = γ¯eQkgˆ
†
k, and
A
(k)
2 = γ¯eQk, k = 1, . . . ,K .
Proof: See Appendix E.
Last, we rewrite (44c) to facilitate the robust optimization
against the errors introduced by ∆hk’s. By applying Lemma
4.1, (44c) holds if and only if there exists µk ≥ 0, k =
1, . . . ,K , such that the following LMI constraint is met:[
ηPsI + µkI ηPshˆk
ηPshˆ
H
k ηPs‖hˆk‖22 − tr(Qk)− µkǫ′k
]
 0, ∀k.
(67)
As such, (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) is now simplified as
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) : max
X,{Qk},δ
δ
s.t. (59), (63), (67), (44b), (44e).
Because of the non-convex term such as δX ′ in (59),
problem (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) remains very hard to solve.
We thus use the bisection method [35] w.r.t. δ to solve
it. However, using bisection in addition to solving (P2′.2)
by one-dimension search over γ¯e may lead to very high
complexity. As a result, we propose an alternative problem
to approximate Hˆ(γ¯e).
2) Solutions to (P2′.1-RW-SDR): We propose to approx-
imate Hˆ(γ¯e) by the optimum value of the following problem.
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) : max
X,{Qk},τ
min
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X) (68a)
s.t. max
h˜k∈H˜k,∀k
h˜0∈H˜0
σ2r tr(Y 1X)+
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k+τσ
2
b ≤1, (68b)
max
gk∈Gk,∀k
g0∈G0
Pstr(F 2X)
σ2r tr(Y 2X) +
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k + τσ
2
e
≤ γ¯e, (68c)
tr(ΦX) ≤ τPr , (68d)
tr (Qk) ≤ τηPs min
hk∈Hk,∀k
‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (68e)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k, τ ≥ 0. (68f)
Remark 4.1: It is worth noting that as the numerator and the
denominator of the objective function in (P2′.1) are coupled
by common uncertainty h˜0, Charnes-Cooper transformation,
in general, cannot be applied to realize equivalent decoupling.
As a result, (P2′.1-RW-SDR) yields a more conservative ap-
proximation for Hˆ(γ¯e) than (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv). However,
considering that (P2′.1-RW-SDR) needs to be solved only
once for given γ¯e in contrast with (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv)
requring isection over δ, we exploit it in the sequel. The
effectiveness of this approximation will be evaluated in Sec-
tion V-B.
To proceed, we rewrite (P2′.1-RW-SDR) as
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) : max
X,{Qk},δ,τ
δ
s.t. min
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X) ≥ δ, (69a)
(68b)–(68f). (69b)
First, by rewriting F = f †1f
T
1 , where f1 = fˆ1 +∆f1, in
line with Lemma 4.1, the implication ‖∆f1‖2 ≤ ‖h0‖2ǫ′0 ⇒
9(69a) holds if and only if there exists s′(0) ≥ 0 such that the
following LMI constraint is satisfied:[
PsX + s
′(0)I PsXfˆ
†
1
Psfˆ
T
1X Psfˆ
T
1Xfˆ
†
1 − s′(0)ǫ′0‖h0‖22 − δ
]
 0.
(70)
Next, as tr(Y 1X) = yT1X
′y
†
1 (c.f. (56)), where y1 =
vec(h˜
T
0 ⊗I), after some manipulation, (68b) holds if and only
if there exists s′′(0) ≥ 0 such that[
s′′(0)I − σ2rX ′ −σ2rX ′yˆ†1
−σ2r yˆT1X ′ c
]
 0, (71)
where c = −σ2r yˆT1X ′yˆ†1 −
∑K
k=1 h˜
T
kQkh˜
†
k − τσ2b + 1 −
s′′(0)Ntǫ
′
0. Then (68b) can be rewritten as
(71) for h˜k ∈ H˜k, ∀k, (72)
which is handled by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3: The semi-indefinite constraints in (72) can
be replaced by the following LMI constraint: H¯
(K)
F¯
(K)
G¯
(K)
F¯
(K)H
c¯(K) B¯
(K)H
G¯
(K)H
B¯
(K)
A¯
(K)
− s′′(K)
0 0 00 1 0
0 0 −Iǫ′′K
  0,
(73)
where H¯(K) and F¯ (K) are recursively given by
H¯
(k)
=
[
A¯
(k−1)
+ s
′′(k−1)I
ǫ′′
k−1
G¯
(k−1)H
G¯
(k−1)
H¯
(k−1)
]
, F¯
(k)
=
[
B¯
(k−1)
F¯
(k−1)
]
k = 2, . . . ,K;
H¯
(1)
= s′′(0)I − σ2rX ′, F¯ (1) = −σ2rX ′yˆ†1,
(74)
where G¯(k) = G(k)1 , B¯
(k)
= −Qk ˆ˜h†k, A¯
(k)
= −Qk, c¯(k) =
−σ2r yˆT1X ′yˆ†1−Σkj=1 ˆ˜hTj Qj ˆ˜h†j−ΣKi=k+1h˜
T
i Qih˜
†
i − τσ2b +1−
s′′(0)Ntǫ
′
0−Σk−1l=1 s′′(l), k = 1, . . . ,K , and {s′′(k) ≥ 0} denote
the auxiliary variables.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Proposition 4.4: The constraint in (68c) is guaranteed if
and only if there exists s(k) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K , such that
the following LMI holds:H(K) F (K) G(K)F (K)H c′(K) B′(K)H
G(K)H B′(K) A′(K)
− s(K)
0 0 00 1 0
0 0 −IǫK
  0,
(75)
where H(k) and F (k) are recursively given by
H(k)=
[
A′(k−1)+ s
(k−1)I
ǫk−1
G(k−1)H
G(k−1) H(k−1)
]
,F (k)=
[
B′(k−1)
F (k−1)
]
k = 2, . . . ,K;
H(1) = −PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′ + s(0)I,
F (1) =
(−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′) gˆ†,
(76)
in which G(k) = G(k)1 , B
′(k) = γ¯eQkgˆ
†
k, A
′(k) = γ¯eQk,
c′(k) = gˆT (−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′)gˆ† + γ¯e
∑k
j=1 gˆ
T
j Qj gˆ
†
j +
γ¯e
∑K
i=k+1 g
T
i Qig
†
i + γ¯eτσ
2
e − s(0)Ntǫ0 −
∑k−1
l=1 s
(l)
, k =
1, . . . ,K , and {s(k) ≥ 0} denote the auxiliary variables.
Proof: It is observed that (68c) differs from (44a) in the
only respect that σ2e is replaced by τσ2e . Hence the proof for
Proposition 4.2 can be directly applied herein by substituting
τσ2e for σ2e .
Last, by replacing “ηPs” in (44c) with “τηPs” in (68e),
(68e) can be replaced by a similar LMI as (67), denoted by
(68e′), in which the pertinent auxiliary variables are denoted
by {µk ≥ 0}.
Consequently, the equivalent reformulation for problem
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) can be summarized as
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) : max
X,{Qk},δ,τ,
s(0),s′(0),s′′(0),
{s(k)},{s′′(k)},{µk}
δ
s.t. (70), (73), (75), (68e′), (68d), (68f),
s(0) ≥ 0, s′(0) ≥ 0, s′′(0) ≥ 0, (77a)
s(k) ≥ 0, s′′(k) ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0, ∀k. (77b)
C. Proposed Rank-One Solutions to (P2′.1)
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) is convex and can be solved efficiently by
convex optimization tools such as CVX. Next, we derive the
Lagrangian of (P2′.1-RW-SDR). Note that in the following
expression, we only consider the uncertainties regarding h˜0,
hk’s, h˜k’s, g0 and gk’s when K = 1 for the purpose of
simplicity and the results can be easily extended to the case
of K > 1. Denote the dual variables associated with (68d),
(70), (73) and (75) by β0, W , V and Y , respectively. Then
the partial Lagrangian of (P2′.1-RW-SDR) w.r.t. X is
L(Ω) = tr(A¯X), (78)
where Ω is the set of all primal and dual variables, and
A = PsW 1,1 + 2Psℜ{fˆ†1W T12}+ Psw2,2Fˆ 1
− σ2r
Nt∑
i=1
(
V
(i,i)
1,1 + 2ℜ{V
(i,i)
1,2 }+ V
(i,i)
2,2
)
− Ps(hH0 ⊗ I)Y 1,1(h0 ⊗ I) + 2σ2r γ¯e
N2t∑
i=1
ℜ{Y (i,i)2,1 }
− 2Psℜ{(hH0 ⊗ I)Y 2,1(h0 ⊗ I)}
− Psy2,2(hH0 ⊗ I)gˆ†gˆT (h0 ⊗ I) + σ2r γ¯e
N2t∑
i=1
Y
(i,i)
2,2 .
(79)
In (79), Fˆ 1 = fˆ
†
1fˆ
T
1 ; W i,j , i, j = 1, 2, V i,j , i, j = 1, . . . , 3
and Y i,j , i, j = 1, . . . , 3 are the block submatrices of
W ∈ C(N2t+1)×(N2t+1), V ∈ C(N3t+Nt+1)×(N3t+Nt+1) and
Y ∈ C(N3t+2Nt+1)×(N3t+2Nt+1) with the same size as block
submatrices in (70), (73) and (75), respectively. Moreover, in
(79), V 1,2 = yˆ†1V T1,2, V 2,2 = v2,2yˆ†1yˆT1 , Y 2,1 = gˆ†yT1,2
and Y 2,2 = y2,2gˆ†gˆT . Furthermore, V (i,i)1,1 , V
(i,i)
1,2 and V
(i,i)
2,2
are the ith block diagonal submatrices of V 1,1 ∈ CN3t×N3t ,
V 1,2 ∈ CN3t×N3t and V 2,2 ∈ CN3t×N3t , respectively; Y (i,i)2,1
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and Y (i,i)2,2 are the ith block diagonal submatrices of Y 2,1 ∈
CN
3
t×N
3
t , and Y 2,2 ∈ CN3t×N3t , respectively.
Proposition 4.5: 1) The optimal X∗ to
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) is expressed as
X∗ =
N2t−r¯c∑
n=1
a¯nη¯nη¯
H
n + b¯ξ¯ξ¯
H
, (80)
where a¯n ≥ 0, ∀n, b¯ > 0, and ξ¯ ∈ CN2t×1 is a unit-norm
vector orthogonal to Ξ¯ (c.f. (28)).
2) According to (80), if rank(X∗) > 1, i.e., there exists at
least one a¯n > 0, we reconstruct a solution to problem
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) using
Xˆ
∗
= b¯ξ¯ξ¯
H
, (81)
δˆ∗ = δ∗, (82)
τˆ∗ = τ∗, (83)
while {Qˆ∗k} are obtained by solving the following feasi-
bility problem provided that Xˆ
∗
, δˆ∗, and τˆ∗ are given by
(81), (82) and (83), respectively:
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-sub) : max
{Qk},s
′′(0),
{s′′(k)},{µk}
0
s.t. (73) given Xˆ∗, τˆ∗, (68e′) given τˆ∗,
Qk  0, µk ≥ 0, ∀k,
s′′(0) ≥ 0, s′′(k) ≥ 0, ∀k.
Proof: See Appendix G.
The scheme that solves (P2′) is summarized in Table II.
TABLE II
Algorithm II for (P2′)
• Initialize γ¯′
e search = 0 : α
′ : γ¯′emax and i = 0
• Repeat
1) Set i = i+ 1;
2) Given γ¯e = γ¯′e search(i),
solve (P2′.1-RW-SDR) and obtain Hˆ(γ¯(i)e ).
• Until i = L′, where L′ = ⌊ γ¯
′
emax
α′
⌋+ 1 is the length of γ¯′
e search
• Set γ¯∗e = γ¯′e search
(
argmax
i
{
1+Hˆ(γ¯
(i)
e )
1+γ¯
(i)
e
})
for (P2′.2)
• Given γ¯∗e , solve (P2′.1-RW-SDR) to obtain (X∗, {Q∗k}, δ∗, τ∗)
if rank(X∗) = 1, apply EVD on X∗ such that X∗ = w∗w∗H ;
else
– construct (Xˆ∗, δˆ∗, τˆ∗), according to (81)-(83) and set w∗ =√
b¯ξ¯;
– given Xˆ∗, δˆ∗ and τˆ∗,
obtain {Qˆ∗k} by solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR-sub).
end
• Recover W ∗ = vec−1(w∗)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we provide numerical examples to validate our results.
We assume a typical scenario where the K helpers are evenly
distributed around Alice with a radius of ρk = 2m and θk =
2π(k−1)
K (radian by default), where θk is the angle of direction
(w.r.t. the Alice-relay link by default) of the kth helper, k =
1, . . . ,K . Alice, Bob and Eve are, w.l.o.g., assumed to have
the same distance away from the AF relay with their angle
of direction π, π/6 and 11π/6, respectively. We also assume
channel models with both large-scale fading, i.e., path loss and
shadowing, and small-scale fading, i.e., multi-path fading. The
simplified large-scale fading model is given by [39]
D = zA0
(
d
d0
)−α
, for d ≥ d0, (84)
where z is a log-normal random variable capturing the effect
of shadowing with the standard derivation σ = 4dB, A0 =
10−3, d is the distance, d0 is a reference distance set to be
1m, and α = 2 is the path loss exponent. Specifically, the
channels including hk’s, h0, h˜0 and g0, are assumed to suffer
from Rician fading while the channels from the HJ helpers to
Bob (h˜k’s) and Eve (gk’s) follow Rayleigh distribution due
to the missing of line-of-sight (LOS) components with their
respective average gain specified by (84). Take hk, ∀k, as
an example, hk =
√
KR
KR+1
h¯k +
√
1
KR+1
hˇk, where h¯k is
the LOS component with ‖h¯k‖22 = D (c.f. (84)), hˇk is the
Rayleigh fading component denoted by hˇk ∼ CN (0, DI),
and KR is the Rician factor set to be 3. Note that for the
involved LOS component, we use the far-field uniform linear
antenna array to model the channels [40]. In addition, unless
otherwise specified, the number of HJ helpers, K is set to be
5; the AF relay is assumed to be 5m away from Alice; the
EH efficiency, η = 0.5 and σ2r = σ2b = σ2e = −50dBm. The
results presented in Section V-A are obtained by averaging
over 500 times of independent trials.
A. The Perfect CSI Case
We compare the proposed optimal solutions with three
suboptimal schemes in the case of perfect CSI. One suboptimal
scheme, denoted by “Suboptimal 1”, is introduced in Sec-
tion III-C1 by exploiting the optimal structure ofW . The other
described in Section III-C2 is known as optimal null-space ZF,
denoted by “Suboptimal 2”. Specifically, each jamming beam
nk is restricted to lie in the orthogonal space of h˜
†
k such
that nk’s cause no interference to the IR while maximizing
its effect of jamming at the eavesdropper. As a benchmark,
we also present the well-known isotropic jamming that is
particularly useful when there is no Eve’s CSI known at each
HJ helper, Hk, ∀k [41], denoted by “Suboptimal 3”. Note that
the difference between “Suboptimal 2” and “Suboptimal 3”
only lies in the design of jamming noise, for which the former
also aligns the jamming noise to an equivalent Eve’s channel to
confront Eve with most interference, while the latter transmits
isotropic jamming with n˜k ∼ CN (0, ηPs‖hk‖2/(Nt − 1)),
k = 1, . . . ,K , in directions orthogonal to h˜k’s, due to lack of
knowledge of Eve’s channel and thus is expected to be less
efficient than “Suboptimal 2” with perfect CSI.
First, we study the secrecy rate at the receiver versus the
transmit power of the transmitter, Ps with Pr = 10dBm. Fig. 2
demonstrates that for both cases of Nt = 3 and Nt = 5,
the average secrecy rate increases and tends to be saturated
as Ps goes to 30dBm. It also illustrates that “suboptimal 1”
and “suboptimal 2” closely approach the optimal solutions
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus the relay’s transmit power with perfect CSI.
while “Suboptimal 3” is outperformed more succinctly with
larger number of antennas at the AF relay and the HJ helpers.
Moreover, with Nt increasing, the average secrecy rate gets
larger as a result of the higher array gain of the AF relay and
more available power transferred to the HJ helpers.
In addition, we show in Fig. 3 the secrecy rate achieved by
different schemes versus the transmit power of the AF relay,
Pr with Ps = 30dBm. It is seen that the average secrecy rate
first grows faster and then slower, since when Pr increases,
not only the desired signal but also the noise yielded from
the first transmission phase is amplified to a larger extent.
In addition, the performance gap between the optimal scheme
and suboptimal schemes is almost negligible. Similar to Fig. 2,
“Suboptimal 3” appears to have certain performance loss from
the optimality but is considered as a promising scheme when
no Eve’s CSI is available at the HJ helpers.
B. The Imperfect CSI Case
Now, we consider the imperfect CSI case and compare the
proposed scheme Robust SDR with HJ, which is obtained
by solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR-sub), against some benchmarks.
Note that there are two upper-bound benchmark schemes,
namely, Robust SDR with HJ and Robust-eqv with HJ, as well
as two lower-bound benchmarks, which are Robust w/o HJ
and Non-robust with HJ. For Robust SDR with HJ (Robust-
eqv with HJ), given any γ¯e, Hˆ(γ¯e) is approximated by
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Fig. 4. CDFs of the achievable secrecy rate.
solving the rank constraint relaxed problem (P2′.1-RW-SDR)
((P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv)). On the other hand, for Robust w/o
HJ, we solve (P2′.1-RW-SDR) by setting Qk = 0, ∀k while
for Non-robust with HJ, (11) is evaluated by applying the
optimal solutions to (P1′.1) assuming perfect CSI, to the
actual channels including errors that are generated from the
sets defined in (41).
To assess the worst-case secrecy performance, we use the
metric, namely, secrecy outage probability, defined as [42]:
p = Pr(r ≤ r∗0), (85)
where r∗0 obtained by solving (P2′) is termed as the 100p%-
secrecy outage rate.
The parameters are set identical to those in the perfect CSI
case. Regarding the uncertainty model in (41), we introduce
the uncertainty ratios associated with ǫ0, ǫ′0, ǫk, ǫ′k and ǫ′′k as
α0, α
′
0, αk, α
′
k and α′′k , respectively. For instance, α0 is
α20 =
ǫ0
E[‖g0‖2]
, (86)
while α′0, αk’s, α′k’s and α′′k’s are similarly defined and thus
omitted here for brevity. Besides, it is reasonable to assume
that the channel estimates w.r.t Eve suffer from more errors
than those for Alice and Bob. Hence, we set α′20 = α′2k =
α′′2k = 1% while α20 = α2k = 10%, k = 1, . . . ,K , unless
otherwise specified.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the cumulative density function (CDF)
of the achievable secrecy rate from 1000 samples of ran-
dom channel errors uniformly distributed over the sets de-
fined by (41) given fixed actual channel realization. We set
Pr = 20dBm, Ps = 30dBm, Nt = 3, K = 5 and
α′20 = α
′2
k = α
′′2
k = 2%, k = 1, . . . ,K . Despite being
suboptimal to the upper-bound schemes of “Robust SDR with
HJ” and “Robust-eqv with HJ”, the proposed “Robust with HJ”
scheme outperforms its non-robust counterpart “Non-robust
with HJ” particularly in the low range of probability, and
overwhelmingly surpasses the “Robust w/o HJ”. For example,
“Robust with HJ” can achieve a secrecy rate of around
3.5bps/Hz in the 3% worst case versus that of 3.3bps/Hz and
1.0bps/Hz for the “Non-robust with HJ” and “Robust w/o HJ”,
respectively. The solutions for “Robust SDR with HJ” is also
seen to admit very little gap from those for “Robust-eqv with
HJ”, which suggests that approximating Hˆ(γ¯e) by solving the
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complexity reduced “Robust SDR with HJ ” leads almost no
performance loss.
Fig. 5 illustrates the CDF of the achievable secrecy rate from
1000 samples of random channel errors generated in the same
way as Fig. 4, with Pr = 20dBm, Ps = 30dBm and Nt = 3. It
is observed that proposed solutions to “Robust with HJ” nearly
achieve their upper-bound rank constraint relaxed solutions,
i.e., SDR, to “Robust upper SDR with HJ” throughout the
whole range of outage probability. Moreover, the “Robust
w/o HJ” yields the worst performance. In particular, when
the outage probability falls to 3%, the “Robust w/o HJ”
achieves a worst-case secrecy rate of less than 1bps/Hz while
the proposed scheme can still guarantee an outage rate of
rough 1.64bps/Hz and 2.07bps/Hz for K = 5 and K = 6,
respectively. Also, it is observed that increasing the number
of HJ helpers will improve the secrecy performance, but we do
not draw conclusions on the extent to which the secrecy rate
can increase, since it also depends on the level of channel
estimation inaccuracy. For example, more HJ helpers may
also yield larger interference to the legitimate receiver if the
channels from HJ helpers to Bob are not as well estimated
as this instance of α′′2k = 1%, ∀k. Hence we suggest that in
practice, a mild number of HJ helpers are sufficient in view
of the trade-off between complexity and performance.
Fig. 6 shows two different levels (p = 0.20 and p = 0.30)
of secrecy outage rate versus the channel uncertainty ratios
(assuming α0 = αk, k = 1, . . . ,K), in which Pr = 30dBm,
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage rate versus the relay’s transmit power.
Ps = 30dBm, Nt = 3 and K = 5. It is observed that the
secrecy outage rate by the proposed schemes decreases slowly
with the eavesdropper’s CSI error ratios, which validates the
motivation of the worst-case robust optimization. It is worth
noting that the advantage of the HJ protocol is more significant
when the normalized channel uncertainty of Eve’s channels
surpasses 10%, since the HJ scheme provides more degree
of freedom for robust design and thus capable of guaranteeing
larger worst-case secrecy rate against worse channel conditions
compared to that without HJ. The reasonably suboptimal
performance of the proposed “Robust with HJ” is also seen as
from Figs. 4 and 5.
Fig. 7 studies the 100p%-secrecy outage rate for p = 0.05
and p = 0.20, respectively, versus the transmit power of the
AF relay. Specifically, we set Ps = 30dBm, Nt = 3, and K =
5. As observed similarly from Fig. 6, the robust schemes with
the assistance of HJ helpers perform considerably better than
solutions without HJ helpers. Furthermore, when the transmit
power is set relatively large, i.e., Ps = 30dBm, it is seen that
continuously increasing Pr does not contribute much to the
secrecy performance, because in this situation the increased
amplified noise at the AF relay compromises the performance,
which provides useful insight for practical setting of Pr. In
addition, the proposed “Robust with HJ” is observed striking
a good trade-off between optimality and complexity compared
with the two upper-bound solutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered improving the secret wireless com-
munications in a multi-antenna AF relay wiretap channel via
a novel harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol. The AN co-
variance matrices at HJ helpers and the AF relay beamforming
matrix have been jointly optimized to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate and/or worst-case secrecy rate at the legitimate
receiver subject to the transmit power constraints of the AF
relay as well as the HJ helpers, on perfect and imperfect CSI
occasions, respectively, using the technique of semi-definite
relaxation (SDR). The SDR was shown tight for the perfect
CSI case while suboptimal rank-one reconstruction algorithms
for the robust formulation under imperfect CSIs were pre-
sented achieving promising tradeoffs between complexity and
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performance. The effectiveness of the proposed schemes were
also verified by numerical results.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
The KKT conditions of (P1′.1-RW-SDR) are given by
A∗X∗ = 0, (87a)
B∗kQ
∗
k = 0, ∀k, (87b)
β∗k
(
tr(Q∗k)− τ∗ηPs‖hk‖2
)
= 0, ∀k. (87c)
According to (26), if for certain k, β∗k = 0, then B∗k =
−λ∗h˜∗kh˜
T
k +α
∗γ¯eg
∗
kg
T
k and thus rank(B
∗
k) ≤ rank(h˜
∗
kh˜
T
k )+
rank(g∗kg
T
k ) = 2, which yields rank(Q
∗
k) ≥ Nt − 2 as
a result of (87b). Otherwise, when β∗k > 0, we will have
rank(B∗k) ≥ rank(−β∗kI − λ∗h˜
∗
kh˜
T
k ) − rank(α∗γ¯eg∗kgTk ) =
Nt − 1 [7, Lemma A.1], which implies rank(Q∗k) ≤ 1.
However, rank(Q∗k) cannot be 0, since otherwise tr(Q∗k) −
τ∗ηPs‖hk‖2 < 0 and thus β∗k = 0 according to (87c), which
contradicts to β∗k > 0. Hence, when β∗k > 0, rank(Q
∗
k) = 1.
Next, define C∗ = −λ∗σ2rY 1 − α∗PsF 2 + α∗γ¯eσ2rY 2 −
β∗0Φ and according to (25), we have
A∗ = PsF 1 +C
∗. (88)
Then define rc, Ξ and ηn, n = 1, . . . , N2t − rc (c.f. (28)).
Similar to the approach used in [7, Appendix B], we discuss
the structure of the optimal X under two cases.
(1) Case I: rc = N2t . As C∗ is full-rank, rank(A∗) ≥ rc −
1 = N2t − 1 and hence N2t − 1 ≤ rank(A∗) ≤ N2t . If
rank(A∗) = N2t − 1, rank(null(A∗)) = 1 and it follows
that X∗ = bξξH by assuming ξ as the only basis of
null(A∗). Otherwise, according to (87a), we obtainX∗ =
0, which ceases the secrecy transmission and cannot be
the optimal solution to (P1′.1-RW-SDR).
(2) Case II: rc < N2t . If C∗ is not full-rank, rank(A∗) ≥
rc − 1. Then by pre-multiplying ηHn and post-multiplying
ηn ∈ Ξ with both sides of (88), we have
ηHn A
∗ηn = Psη
H
n F 1ηn + η
H
n C
∗ηn = Psη
H
n F 1ηn, ∀n.
(89)
According to (24), it is necessary for A∗  0 to obtain
an optimal solution of X∗ and therefore ηHn A∗ηn ≤ 0,
which conforms to PsηHn F 1ηn ≥ 0 if and only if
A∗ηn = 0 and F 1ηn = 0. Hence, Ξ ⊆ null(A∗), i.e.,
N2t − rank(A∗) ≥ N2t − rc ⇒ rank(A∗) ≤ rc. Next, we
show rank(A∗) 6= rc by contradiction. If rank(A∗) = rc,
Ξ = null(A∗), and X∗ =
∑N2t−rc
n=1 anηnη
H
n . However,
in this case, since F 1ηn = 0, Pstr(F 1X
∗) = 0, which
is apparently not optimal. Hence, we have rank(A∗) =
rc − 1 and thus rank(null(A∗)) = N2t − rc + 1. This
indicates that besides the basis in Ξ, null(A∗) spans over
an extra dimension of basis, which is denoted by ξ, and
hence X∗ =
∑N2t−rc
n=1 anηnη
H
n + bξξ
H
.
Assume that (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ∗) is the optimal solution to
(P1′.1-RW-SDR) with rank(X∗) > 1. Then construct a new
solution {Xˆ∗, Qˆ∗k, τˆ∗} according to (29)–(31). Now, we check
if the reconstructed solution is feasible if (32) holds. First,
σ2r tr(Y 1Xˆ
∗
) +
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
k Qˆ
∗
kh˜
†
k + τˆ
∗σ2b
≤ σ2rtr
Y 1
X∗ − N2t −rc∑
n=1
anηnη
H
n
+ K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQ
∗
kh˜
†
k
+
τ∗ + σ2r
σ2
b
N2t−rc∑
n=1
antr(Y 1ηnη
H
n )
σ2b
= σ2rtr(Y 1X
∗) +
K∑
k=1
h˜
T
kQ
∗
kh˜
†
k + τ
∗σ2b
(a)
≤ 1. (90)
Moreover,
Pstr(F 2Xˆ
∗
) = Pstr
F 2(X∗ − N2t−rc∑
n=1
anηnη
H
n )

(b)
≤ γ¯e
(
σ2rtr(Y 2X
∗) +
K∑
k=1
gTkQ
∗
kg
†
k + τ
∗σ2e
)
+ γ¯e
σ2e∆τ − σ2rtr
Y 2 N2t−rc∑
n=1
anηnη
H
n

= γ¯e
(
σ2r tr(Y 2Xˆ
∗
) +
K∑
k=1
gTk Qˆ
∗
kg
†
k + τˆ
∗σ2e
)
. (91)
In addition, (23c)–(23e) are easily shown to satisfy. In the
above, (a) and (b) hold due to the feasibility in (23a) and
(23b), respectively. Further, Pstr(F 1Xˆ∗) = Pstr(F 1X∗)
shows that the reconstructed solution achieves the same opti-
mum value as that of (P1′.1-RW-SDR). Hence, an optimal
solution to (P1′.1-RW-SDR) with rank-one X is ensured.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.3
First, we construct W as
W = [U †1, (U
⊥
1 )
†]
[
B C
D E
]
[U2,U
⊥
2 ]
H
= U †1BU
H
2 +U
†
1C(U
⊥
2 )
H + (U⊥1 )
†DUH2
+ (U⊥1 )
†E(U⊥2 )
H , (92)
where B ∈ C2×2, C ∈ C2×(Nt−2), D ∈ C(Nt−2)×2 and E ∈
C(Nt−2)×(Nt−2) are undetermined matrices. Then according to
(33) and (34), it follows that |h˜T0Wh0|2 = |h˜
T
0U
†
1BU
H
2 h0|2
and h˜
T
0WW
H h˜
†
0 = ‖BHUT1 h˜
†
0‖2 + ‖CHUT1 h˜
†
0‖2. Sim-
ilarly, we also have |gT0Wh0|2 = |gT0U †1BUH2 h0|2 and
gT0WW
Hg
†
0 = ‖gT0 U †1B‖2+‖gT0 U †1C‖2. Thus, γb (c.f. (9))
and γe (c.f. (10)) do not depend on D and E.
Next, by substituting (92) for W in (5), we have Pr ≥
Ps(‖BUH2 h0‖2 + ‖DUH2 h0‖2) + σ2rtr(BHB + CHC +
DHD +EHE). Since (P1′) is a secrecy rate maximization
problem subject to the given Pr, it turns out that given the
optimum secrecy rate, Pr is the minimized required power
by taking D = 0 and E = 0, while B and C cannot be
determined directly. Thus, W = U †1BU
H
2 +U
†
1C(U
⊥
2 )
H
.
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C. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Denoting the dual variable associated with (39a), (39b)
and (39c) by λ, α and β0, respectively, the Lagrangian of
(P1′.1-sub2-SDR) is expressed as
L(χ) =
tr
(
(PsF 1 − λσ2rY 1 − αPsF 2 + αγ¯eσ2rY 2 − β0Φ)X
)
+
(−λσ2b + αγ¯e(q + σ2e) + β0Pr) τ + λ, (93)
where χ = {X, τ, λ, α, β0} denotes the set consist-
ing of all the primal and dual variables. Since problem
(P1′.1-sub2-SDR) satisfies the Slater condition, its optimum
value admits zero duality gap with its dual counterpart. Fur-
thermore, according to (93), in order for the dual function to
be bounded from above, the following constraints must hold:
Z = PsF 1 − λσ2rY 1 − αPsF 2 + αγ¯eσ2rY 2 − β0Φ  0, (94)
− λσ2b + αγ¯e(q + σ2e) + β0Pr ≤ 0. (95)
The dual problem is therefore given by
(D-P1′.1-sub2-SDR) : min
λ,α,β0
λ
s.t. (94), (95), (96a)
(λ, α, β0)
T ≥ 0. (96b)
It is observed that Z is of the same form as the Hessian
matrix with respect to X without rank relaxation. Accord-
ing to [43, Theorem 2.1], Z  0 implies that the SDR
problem (P1′.1-sub2-SDR) is tight in this case, i.e., ∃w∗
such that X∗ = w∗w∗H . Moreover, since KKT condition
necessitates Z∗X∗ = 0, it follows that w∗ is the eigenvector
corresponds to the zero-eigenvalue of Z∗. Hence, we have
w∗ = µνmax(Z
∗), where µ =
√
Pr
tr(Φ)νmax(Z
∗
)νHmax(Z
∗
)
is
due to the power constraint of (23c), which completes the
proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 4.1
First, given h˜k, k = 2, . . . ,K , fixed, only consider the
uncertainty of h˜1. Since ‖∆h˜1‖22 ≤ ǫ′′1 , we have 1 −
(∆h˜
†
1)
H∆h˜
†
1
ǫ′′1
≥ 0. By applying Lemma 4.2 to (58) with
H1
(1) = PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′ + w(0)I , F 1(1) = (PsX ′′ −
δσ2rX
′)
ˆ˜
h†, G1
(1) = 0, c
(1)
1 =
ˆ˜
hT (PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h† −
δˆ˜hT1Q1
ˆ˜
h
†
1 − δ
∑K
i=2 h˜
T
i Qih˜
†
i − δσ2b − w(0)Ntǫ′0, B1(1) =
−δQ1 ˆ˜h†1, and A1(1) = −δQ1, there exists w(1) ≥ 0 such
that the following LMI holds:

 H
(1)
1 F 1
(1)
G1
(1)
F 1
(1)H c
(1)
1 B1
(1)H
G1
(1)H
B1
(1)
A1
(1)

−w(1)

0 0 00 1 0
0 0
−I
ǫ′′1

  0. (97)
Note that for Q1  0, there always exists w(1) > 0 such
that w
(1)I
ǫ′′1
+A1
(1) ≻ 0 and we assume that such constraint
is applied. According to the property of Schur-Complements
[35, A. 5.5], for (97), we have

[
H1
(1)
F 1
(1)
F 1
(1)H c
(1)
1 − w
(1)
]
−
[
G1
(1)
B1
(1)H
](
A1
(1)
+
w(1)I
ǫ′′1
)
−1 [
G1
(1)H
B1
(1)
]
 0,
w(1)I
ǫ′′1
+A1
(1)
≻ 0,
(98)
which can be reexpressed as
A1
(1)
+
w(1)I
ǫ′′1
G1
(1)H
B1
(1)
G1
(1)
H1
(1)
F 1
(1)
B1
(1)H
F 1
(1)H c
(1)
1 − w
(1)

  0. (99)
Next, assume that the robust design for (58) has been
considered against the precedent k − 1 uncertainties, i.e.,
H1(k−1) F 1(k−1) G1(k−1)F 1(k−1)H c(k−1)1 B1(k−1)H
G1
(k−1)H
B1
(k−1)
A1
(k−1)

− w(k−1)


0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0
−I
ǫ′′
k−1


 0, k ≥ 2. (100)
Applying a similar procedure as that for (97), (100) can be
recast as

w(k−1)I
ǫ′′
k−1
+A1
(k−1)
G1
(k−1)H
B1
(k−1)
G1
(k−1)
H1
(k−1)
F 1
(k−1)
B1
(k−1)H
F 1
(k−1)H c
(k−1)
1 − w
(k−1)

  0.
(101)
Then given h˜i, i = k + 1, . . . ,K fixed, accommodate the
kth uncertainty, i.e., h˜k ∈ H˜k, for (101). By applying Lemma
4.2 to the uncertainty of h˜k, the implication ‖∆h˜k‖22 ≤ ǫ′′k ⇒
(101) holds if and only if there exists w(k) ≥ 0 such that
H1(k) F 1(k) G1(k)F 1(k)H c(k)1 B1(k)H
G1
(k)H
B1
(k)
A1
(k)

− w(k)

0 0 00 1 0
0 0
−I
ǫ′′
k

  0, (102)
where
H1
(k)
=
[
A1
(k−1)
+
w(k−1)I
ǫ′′
k−1
G1
(k−1)H
G1
(k−1)
H1
(k−1)
]
,
F 1
(k)
=
[
B1
(k−1)
F 1
(k−1)
]
, G1
(k)
= 0, (103)
c
(k)
1 =
ˆ˜
hT (PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h† − δ
∑k
j=1
ˆ˜
hTj Qj
ˆ˜
h
†
j −
δ
∑K
i=k+1 h˜
T
i Qih˜
†
i − δσ2b −w(0)Ntǫ′0 −
∑k−1
l=1 w
(l)
, B1
(k) =
−δQk ˆ˜h†k and A1(k) = −δQk, k ≥ 2. Thus, using the
method of mathematical induction, (58) holds for h˜k ∈ H˜k,
k = 1, . . . ,K , if and only if there exists {w(k) ≥ 0}, such
that (59) is satisfied, which completes the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Taking the similar procedure as that for dealing with (57),
the implication ‖∆g‖2 ≤ Ntǫ0 ⇒ (62) holds if and only if
there exists v(0) ≥ 0 such that the following LMI holds:[
H2 F 2
F
H
2 c2
]
 0, (104)
where H2 = −PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′ + v(0)I , F 2 =
(−PsX ′′+ γ¯eσ2rX ′)gˆ† and c2 = gˆT (−PsX ′′+ γ¯eσ2rX ′)gˆ†+
γ¯e
∑K
k=1 g
T
kQkg
†
k+γ¯
2
e−v(0)Ntǫ0. (44a) has been equivalently
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reformulated into (104). Then, given gk, k = 2, . . . ,K , fixed,
applying similar procedure to that in Appendix D, it follows
that there exists v(1) ≥ 0 such that the following LMI holds:
 H
(1)
2 F 2
(1)
G2
(1)
F 2
(1)H c
(1)
2 B2
(1)H
G2
(1)H
B2
(1)
A2
(1)

− v(1)

0 0 00 1 0
0 0
−I
ǫ1

  0. (105)
Since v
(1)I
ǫ1
+A2
(1) ≻ 0 always holds, (105) is equivalent to
the following LMI:
A2
(1)
+
v(1)I
ǫ1
G2
(1)H
B2
(1)
G2
(1)
H2
(1)
F 2
(1)
B2
(1)H
F 2
(1)H c
(1)
2 − v
(1)

  0. (106)
Next, devising the method of mathematical induction again as
that for (99), (104) holds for gk ∈ Gk, ∀k, if and only if there
exists {v(k) ≥ 0}, such that (63) is satisfied, which completes
the proof.
F. Proof of Proposition 4.3
We only sketch the proof herein since it is quite similar
to that of Proposition 4.1. First, apply Lemma 4.2 to (71)
given h˜k’s, k = 2, . . . ,K , fixed and obtain an initial LMI.
Next, manipulate the resulting LMI according to the property
of Schur-Complements to facilitate using Lemma 4.2. Then,
repeat this procedure until all the semi-indefinite constraints
w.r.t. h˜k’s have been incorporated into an equivalent LMI.
G. Proof of Proposition 4.5
According to the KKT conditions of (P2′.1-RW-SDR), we
have A¯∗X∗ = 0, where A¯∗ is given by (79). Define C¯∗ =
A¯
∗−w∗2,2PsFˆ 1 with rank(C¯∗) denoted by r¯c. Then take the
similar procedure as Case I and Case II in Appendix A, it
can be obtained that X∗ =
∑N2t−r¯c
n=1 a¯nη¯nη¯
H
n + b¯ξ¯ξ¯
H
.
Next, we prove the second half of Proposition 4.5. Accord-
ing to (81),
Pstr(Fˆ 1Xˆ
∗
) = Pstr(Fˆ 1X
∗) ≥ min
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X) ≥ δ∗,
(107)
and thus (69a) holds true, which implies that the same
optimal value as (P2′.1-RW-SDR), i.e., δ∗, is achievable.
However, since the constraint in (68c) is ignored, the global
optimal γ¯∗e for (P2′.2) via solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR) is
probably violated in (P2′.1-RW-SDR-sub). For example,
Pstr(F 2Xˆ
∗
)
σ2rtr(Y 2Xˆ
∗
)+
∑
K
k=1 g
T
k
Qˆ
∗
kg
†
k
+τˆ∗σ2e
= γ¯0e ≥ Fˆ (γ¯∗e ), which results
in the actual objective value for (P2′.2), 1+Hˆ(γ¯∗e )1+γ¯0e smaller than
1+Hˆ(γ¯∗e )
1+Fˆ (γ¯∗e )
, and thus suboptimal for (P2′).
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